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THE LONG SHADOW OF INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN’S DEMISE 
 
 
Christina Beatty and Steve Fothergill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rediscovery of old problems 
 
Since the UK’s referendum vote to leave the EU there has been renewed interest in ‘places 
left behind’, and in particular in Britain’s older industrial areas.  Partly this is a reflection of 
Prime Minister Theresa May’s own rhetoric but the revival of interest also reflects the 
realities of voting patterns and economic statistics. 
 
In England and Wales, the older industrial areas away from the big cities – the places once 
dominated by industries such as coal, steel, textiles and heavy engineering – nearly all voted 
for Brexit, generally by a margin of two-to-one.  This came as a shock to commentators who 
thought that the political and economic consequences of industrial job loss, so prominent in 
the 1980s and 90s, had been consigned to the past.  In numerous older industrial towns it 
seems that voters take a negative view of the merits of globalisation and that any spill-overs 
in prosperity from neighbouring cities have largely felt illusory. 
 
In reality, the problems arising from industrial decline never went away.  In this article we 
explain how the loss of industrial jobs, sometimes a generation ago, still casts a shadow 
over the labour market and benefit claimant rates in older industrial Britain and, as a result, 
over contemporary public finances.  We also explain how the UK government’s new interest 
in industrial strategy looks at this stage to offer little transformative.  The full evidence in 
support of our arguments is published elsewhere (see in particular Beatty and Fothergill 
2016a, 2017).  Here we necessarily confine ourselves to the main points. 
 
 
The destruction of industrial Britain 
 
Britain was once a major industrial employer.  In 1966, 8.9 million worked in manufacturing 
and a further 500,000 in the coal industry.  This compares with just 2.9 million employed in 
manufacturing in 2016 and none at all in the coal industry except at a handful of opencast 
sites and tiny drift mines.  The shift from manufacturing to service employment is a 
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phenomenon shared by other advance economies, rooted in differential rates of productivity 
growth and accentuated by globalisation, but in Britain the process of deindustrialisation has 
gone further and faster than just about anywhere else.  The industrial job losses were 
particularly large in the 1980s and 90s.  
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Figure 1: Major industrial job losses since the early 1980s 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam University  
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These job losses were concentrated in specific parts of the country – mostly but not 
exclusively in the ‘older industrial areas’ of the North, Scotland and Wales.  In many cases 
the economic base of whole communities was destroyed.  By contrast, London escaped 
relatively lightly and so did most of its vast hinterland in the South and East of England. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the geography of the job loss since the early 1980s.  Manufacturing 
employment has fallen just about everywhere across the UK so this map does not try to 
show the location of every closure or redundancy over the last three and a half decades. 
Rather, it flags up the biggest or most significant job losses, where major companies or 
industries have shrunk to a fraction of their former scale or disappeared entirely.  The 
concentration in a number of specific areas is especially noticeable.  It is not the whole of the 
North, nor indeed the whole of Scotland or Wales, that has been hard hit.  Many rural areas, 
for example, were less affected.  Anyone familiar with the UK will recognise that it is the 
industrial cities, towns and coalfield areas that suffered the big job losses – central Scotland, 
the North East of England, West Cumbria, a large swathe of the North West of England and 
Yorkshire from Liverpool across to Hull, parts of the Midlands including Birmingham and 
Stoke, and South Wales. 
 
 
Labour market adjustment 
 
The 1980s are remembered in Britain as a period of high unemployment.  The number of 
unemployed hovered around 3 million for a number of years, which was perhaps to be 
expected given the scale of the job loss.  But after the early 1990s recession, the numbers 
claiming unemployment benefits fell away, declining to under 1 million for most of the 2000s 
and after the 2008 financial crisis returning to below 1 million once more.  If claimant 
unemployment alone were to be the guide it might be argued that the UK economy has got 
over deindustrialisation.  Unfortunately, this optimistic assessment is wide of the mark. 
 
The first clue to what was really happening in older industrial areas came from the coalfields.  
By the early 1990s most of the pits had shut but claimant unemployment in the coalfields 
was no higher than when the pits had been working.  This was not what most observers had 
expected.  We therefore picked apart the trends in the coalfield labour market.  How much of 
the low claimant unemployment could be explained by commuting to neighbouring areas, by 
out-migration, or by new job creation?  The conclusion was in fact that the main response to 
coal job loss was a diversion of working-age men into ‘economic inactivity’.  Looking closer, 
this was primarily a withdrawal from the labour market into what the Census called 
‘permanent sickness’ – in practice onto incapacity-related benefits.  So job loss had indeed 
resulted in an increase in benefit claims but not in the way that had been expected. 
 
In a follow-up study we brought the figures forward by a decade or so.  A lot more had 
happened, particularly on the job creation front, but the fundamental conclusion remained 
the same: the big labour market adjustment in response to coal job losses was an increase 
in economic inactivity among working age men.  Furthermore, because many of the ex-
miners had by then reached state pension age it was clear that the increase in economic 
activity must be occurring much more widely across the local workforce.  In effect, job loss 
for one generation was being passed on as higher economic inactivity among the next. 
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The coalfields pointed the way but it quickly became apparent that their experience was not 
unique.  Across the whole of older industrial Britain, from the mid-1980s through to the early 
2000s there was a huge surge in the numbers out of the labour market – ‘economically 
inactive’ – on incapacity-related benefits.  We argued that much of the increase in incapacity 
numbers was a form of ‘hidden unemployment’.  These were men and women who in a fully 
employed economy might have been expected to be in work but whose health problems or 
disabilities entitled them to incapacity-related benefits instead of unemployment benefits. 
 
The increase in incapacity numbers in older industrial Britain occurred among women as well 
as men.  At first this seemed hard to understand because the heavy industries shedding jobs 
had previously mainly employed men.  What became apparent, after much detailed research 
in the former coalfields and elsewhere, is that these days the male and female sides of the 
labour market interact so that a shortfall in opportunities for men is transmitted, through 
competition for jobs, to a difficult local labour market for women in the same places.  Out-of-
work women with health problems or disabilities generally end up on incapacity-related 
benefits just like their male counterparts. 
 
So in response to the large-scale loss of jobs in older industrial Britain claimant 
unemployment did fall back to low levels, but the near-permanent effect has been to raise 
incapacity claimant numbers, both among men and women. 
 
 
The impact on present-day welfare spending 
 
Figure 2 shows the numbers claiming the three main out-of-work benefits, for 1979 to 2016 
for Britain as a whole.  As we noted, the numbers claiming unemployment benefits – 
Jobseeker’s Allowance from 1996 onwards and Universal Credit more recently – have fallen 
back to below 1 million.  The numbers claiming lone parent benefits – Income Support for 
most of this period – rose from around 300,000 at the start of the 1980s to a peak of around 
1 million in the mid-1990s.  The evidence on the geography of lone parent claims points 
clearly to job loss among men as a key factor.  In the places where men’s jobs had 
disappeared, such as older industrial Britain, the ability of men to provide financial support to 
women and children had been eroded.  More recently, the numbers on lone parent benefits 
have fallen, not least because eligibility has gradually been restricted just to those with the 
very youngest children.  The striking feature of Figure 2, however, is the rise in the numbers 
out-of-work on incapacity-related benefits, from around 750,000 to a plateau of around 2.5 
million.  The numbers have declined a little from the all-time high in the early 2000s but not 
by much. 
 
  
6 
 
Figure 2: Working age benefit claimants, 1979-2016 
 
Source: DWP 
 
 
 
There are two remarkable aspects of the incapacity numbers.  First, they are largely 
invisible. The figures surface in the media from time to time but probably few beyond those 
who follow these issues would be aware that the numbers currently out-of-work on 
incapacity-related benefits exceed the numbers on unemployment benefits by three-to-one 
and that, the immediate post-financial crisis years excepted, this has been the situation since 
the end of the 1990s.  The other remarkable aspect of the incapacity numbers is that they 
have stayed so high for so long despite multiple efforts to bring them down. 
 
The key insight comes from the local numbers.  Figure 3 shows the share of adults of 
working age claiming incapacity-related benefits in November 2016, by district across the 
whole of Britain.  It is immediately apparent that there are huge variations across the 
country.  Moreover the pattern is systematic.  The highest incapacity claimant rates are 
mostly found in older industrial Britain – places such as the South Wales Valleys, North East 
England, Merseyside and Clydeside.  In contrast, the incapacity claimant rate in much of the 
South and East of England, especially outside London, is modest. 
 
Typically, the incapacity claimant rate in older industrial Britain is just above or below 10 per 
cent, meaning that one-in-ten of all adults between the ages of 16 and 64 in these places 
are out of the labour market on Employment and Support Allowance or in a diminishing 
number of cases on one of its predecessor benefits.  In Blaenau Gwent in South Wales the 
incapacity claimant rate is 12.0 per cent.  In Glasgow the rate is 11.5 per cent.  In Liverpool it 
is 10.7 per cent, in Stoke-on-Trent 10.0 per cent and in Middlesbrough 9.9 per cent. 
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Figure 3: Incapacity-related benefit claimant rate by district, November 2016 
 
Sources: DWP  
8 
 
Of course, older industrial Britain often has higher underlying levels of ill health so we might 
expect to find higher incapacity claimant rates here.  But it is worth remembering that the 
surge in incapacity claimant numbers in these places only happened after the industrial jobs 
began to disappear.  When the mines, steelworks and the like still employed vast numbers, 
far more people were actually exposed to damaging impacts on their health but far fewer 
made incapacity claims.  What appears to be happening is that where there are plenty of 
jobs the men and women with health problems or disabilities are able to hang on in 
employment or find new work if they are made redundant.  Where the labour market is more 
difficult, as in older industrial Britain, ill health or disability ruins many people’s chances of 
finding and keeping work. 
 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), onto which nearly all incapacity claimants have 
been moved, is not overly generous but in practice many claimants are also entitled to 
additional benefits.  These include Disability Living Allowance, Housing Benefit, Child Tax 
Credit, Council Tax Support, and Industrial Injuries Benefit.  A number of these benefits are 
presently being merged into Universal Credit but the rules governing entitlement are 
essentially carried over from the old system.  Disability Living Allowance (DLA), which is 
currently being replaced by Personal Independence Payments (PIP), is worth singling out: 
around half of all incapacity claimants receive DLA or PIP, and the geography of DLA/PIP 
claims is remarkably similar to the geography of ESA claims. 
 
It is not easy to assess precisely how much this all costs.  The Treasury does not publish 
overall figures but some components can be measured directly and others can be estimated.  
The DWP’s own data for 2015-16 tells us that £14.9bn a year was spent on working age 
incapacity-related benefits, these days nearly all ESA.  To this needs to be added an 
estimated £7.2bn a year paid to the same claimants in the form of DLA/PIP, £7bn a year in 
Housing Benefit and £3.2bn a year in Tax Credits.  The grand total for the benefits received 
by incapacity claimants comes to just under £34bn a year (see Beatty and Fothergill 2016a, 
2017). 
 
The costs to the Exchequer of industrial job loss go still further.  One of the defining features 
of the manufacturing and mining jobs that have been lost on such a grand scale is that they 
were often relatively high value-added, high wage jobs.  In older industrial Britain there has 
been job growth in the wake of industrial decline but all too often it has been in low-
productivity, low-wage activities.  In the former coalfields for example, two of the prime 
sources of new jobs have been call centres and warehouses.  Growth in consumer spending 
has also fuelled job growth in shops, hotels, pubs, restaurants and takeaways.  Few of these 
new jobs are well paid, and many are part-time. 
 
It is the weakness of labour demand in older industrial Britain, stripped of its once dominant 
employers, that has enabled the new employers to get away with low wages.  The ex-miners 
and ex-steelworkers may have baulked at the prospect of work in a call centre or warehouse 
and opted out of the labour market instead, cushioned by redundancy pay, early entitlement 
to pensions and disability benefits, but their sons and daughters have never faced the same 
choices.  With little possibility of remaining on Jobseeker’s Allowance for long periods they 
have had to accept whatever work they can find. 
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Women’s growing involvement in the labour market adds a further twist.  In the places once 
dominated by heavy industry the tradition used to be that male wages supported whole 
families.  Relatively few women with children held paid employment, especially on a full-time 
basis.  That more women in these places now look for paid employment should be welcome 
progress but they do so in some of the most problematic labour markets in the country.  
Local economies have to grow very fast indeed if they are to not only replace the jobs that 
have been lost but also keep up with new labour supply.  In practice, the growth has been 
insufficient and the result has been worklessness, part-time employment and low wages. 
 
All this has knock-on consequences for the Exchequer.  Low wages generate low tax 
returns.  At least as importantly, low wages generate a high bill for in-work benefits, notably 
Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit.  Wherever low wages are the 
norm, spending on in-work benefits is high.  This applies in a number of rural areas, in 
several seaside towns and in the parts of London where less well-off residents are 
concentrated.  But it also applies across most of older industrial Britain. 
 
Faced with a budget deficit that is high and slow to bring down, successive governments 
have chosen to reduce spending on working-age welfare benefits.  The assumption has 
been that reductions in working-age benefits will incentivise claimants to find work and 
encourage in-work claimants to find a better paid job or work longer hours. 
 
In a number of reports (in particular Beatty and Fothergill 2016b) we have documented the 
uneven local and regional impact of the cuts in welfare spending.  Inevitably, they impact 
most in the places where claimants are concentrated.  So it is no surprise that Britain’s older 
industrial areas figure prominently among the worst-hit places.  Once more, it is South 
Wales, the industrial North and the West of Scotland that stand out, whilst large parts of 
southern England around London are much less affected.  It is not difficult to argue that 
communities in older industrial Britain now face punishment in the form of welfare cuts for 
the destruction wrought to their industrial base all those years ago. 
 
 
Industrial Strategy: the way forward? 
 
The alternative would be to address the underlying weakness of the economy in older 
industrial Britain. 
 
Two principles are key.  First, the rhetoric about rebalancing the UK economy needs to be 
turned into reality.  In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis there was much talk about the 
need to move away from an over-reliance on financial services towards an economy based 
more on exports and investment.  This didn’t happen.  If anything, the UK economy became 
more imbalanced as growth returned because the old model based on debt and the housing 
market was rekindled one more time.  A revival in industrial production is central to 
rebalancing the UK economy.  A rebalancing in favour of industry would also be of direct 
benefit to much of older industrial Britain because, even after years of job loss, that is where 
so much of what remains of UK manufacturing is still located. 
 
The other principle is a revival of regional economic policy.  The places where welfare 
claimants are concentrated, out-of-work or on low wages, need to be grown fastest.  At the 
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present time the UK probably has its weakest regional economic policies since the Second 
World War.  Indeed, what masquerades as regional policy is more often the promotion of 
competition between places or the devolution of powers to local authorities, which is really 
about governance and has only a tenuous connection to prosperity. 
 
Whether the UK government’s new industrial strategy (HM Government 2017) marks a 
turning point is however questionable.  Most aspects of the strategy look distinctly like 
‘business as usual’ and this led a Select Committee inquiry to conclude that “while the 
government’s rhetoric marks a step change, and the creation of a new Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has significantly raised expectations, the 
government’s approach appears to be evolutionary” (Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy Committee 2017). 
 
The only substantial new money has been committed to research and development, but here 
the government’s focus is on a narrow range of sectors at the very leading edges of 
technology.  In targeting additional R&D resources at such a small slice of manufacturing, 
large parts of Britain stand to gain very little, and in the first instance much of the R&D 
funding looks likely to find its way to laboratories in and around Oxford, Cambridge and 
London (Fothergill et. al. 2017). 
 
So for the moment the prize of a revival in industrial Britain, and of lower spending on 
welfare that is not based on hitting the poorest places hardest, still seems some way off. 
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